By Juliana A. Torres

An investigative report released this week into how inmate Michael Rigby escaped the Osceola County Jail lists 22 Corrections Department employees that were in violation of jail procedure and/or county policy and explains 25 deficiencies, design flaws or security concerns within the jail itself.

So far, no jail employee has been reprimanded, fired or even been put on paid administrative leave, county spokesman Larry Krause said. In the coming days, a disciplinary report that will list consequences will be released, coupled with a press conference by the Osceola County manager, Krause said.

Specifically, the report lists several instances where officers searching Rigby’s cell should have found evidence that he was carving out a hole in the toilet, attached to the cell wall, which eventually allowed him to escape through the maintenance craw space behind the wall.

During searches of his cell, especially the night before his early morning escape on Feb. 19, Rigby was hovering in front of the toilet, throwing up and claiming to have been sick for several days.

Officers Jarrod Lowe and Bradley Larson, supervised by Cpl. Jason Pietarila, searched Rigby’s cell around 7:15 p.m. the night of Feb. 18. Lowe kicked the toilet fixture, and hit the toilet with a rubber mallet while Rigby sat on it. Larson “failed to notice deficiencies in the bunks,” the report stated.

Lowe, Larson and Pietarila were reported in violation of search procedures for not sufficiently searching the cells, or making the inmates inside move out of the way.

Lowe said he last saw Rigby during the head count at 10:30 p.m. Lowe conducted 14 periodic checks, every 30 minutes, into Rigby’s cell during the morning of his escape. Though the Osceola County Sheriff’s Office reported that Rigby escaped sometime after midnight, Lowe reported seeing what looked like Rigby sleeping and breathing, covered in blankets.

The Sheriff’s Office reported that Rigby and his roommate, inmate David Saunders, spent two weeks planning the escape. Nine officers and three corporals responsible for supervising them were found in violation of search procedures because they didn’t find anything suspicious or wrong with Rigby’s cell prior of the morning of his escape.

Search reports for the two weeks prior to the escape list a number of contraband items found in cells, including trash, gloves, extra blankets, uniforms and toilet paper, a sharpened paper clip and a spork. No contraband was found in Rigby and Saunders’ cell during that time period.

Four civilian employees were reported for failing to record entries in the log book around the time Rigby escaped. Further, Sgt. Eugene Kelly was reported for cut-and-pasting an entry about the previous day’s random search into the electronic version of the log before and then not deleting it when he found out the random search already had been conducted early that morning, the morning Rigby escaped.

At 5:30 a.m. that morning, Officer Miller Chavous replaced Lowe and began a physical security search of his assigned area, which included the maximum security housing, at 5:48 a.m. He was interrupted by the arrival of the breakfast meal, which he subsequently delivered to CE 8B, where Rigby had been detained.

It was after Chavous put the food tray into the in the cell that Saunders told him that his roommate Rigby had escaped. Chavous looked into the cell and could see the hole cut into the toilet fixture.

Chavous was cited for not reporting the escape to the watch commander first, instead going to his immediate supervisor. Lt. Vernon Herrington, the watch commander, was found in violation of procedure for not notifying the Sheriff’s Office immediately after he found out about the escape, around 6:10 a.m. that morning. Instead, he prioritized “collateral duties,” including making copies, collecting administrative data and notifying jail administrators of the escape, according to the report.

The Sheriff’s Office didn’t know about the escape until 6:31 a.m.

Policy changes

The report lists specific policy failures that should be enhanced to increase security in the future. First, during cell searches, it recommends inmates be kept in a secured caged area outside their cell while officers search. Further, during the 30-minute checks, officers “must ensure he or she sees human flesh.” Periodic head counts will require inmates to stand outside their cell door.

Finally, the watch commander will be required to immediately notify the Sheriff’s Office in the event of a future escape.

The jail’s ‘deficiencies’

Part of the escape investigation included an analysis of the jail itself. The report included explanations as well as photos showing inconsistencies in security.

The first of the findings involved the perimeter of the jail, specifically two sets of razor-wire-lined fencing Rigby got past to escape jail property.

“Razor wire surrounding the entire facility needs to be reassessed due to inadequacies discovered during the assessment,” the report stated, also identifying “multiple areas of insufficient, misplaced or substandard razor ribbon placement.”

Insufficient coverage was found in the fencing material above vehicle access gates. The report also recommends heavier gauge wire be replaced with light gauge wire “to prevent inmates from climbing the fence.” Investigators also found locks that were “possibly inadequate and damaged due to rusting.”

Lighting along the perimeter was found insufficient and in some cases not functioning. Further, jail personnel only conduct outside perimeter checks twice per 12-hour shift. The only tower along the perimeter fence line, the “recreational tower,” is staffed only during daylight hours.

Part of the report concentrates on the “C-pod exterior door” and a utility ladder Rigby used to gain access to the roof. The report also recommends that razor wire be installed “around the pole to prevent climbing,” but the specific finding is redacted from the report.

Several recommendations were made for inside the jail facility. For one, the “food flaps” on cell doors are worn down and can be easily opened by inmates from within the cell. Also, small windows used by officers to see into the cell are too high and don’t give officers a clear view. The report recommends the window be replaced by one-way glass, so that inmates would only see their own reflection and couldn’t monitor officers.

The report recommends the installation of more cameras and suggests that the high-risk confinement cell block be staffed by two officers, one more than current policy requires.

In one of the final findings, the report explains that C-pod, the section of the jail from which Rigby escaped, was part of the original structure built in 1983. It recommended restructuring the current housing assignments within the facility to “enhance security measures needed to house high-risk/special management inmates.”

The reason for the reassignment recommendation is redacted from the public copy of the report.